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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1.11 RT NE EDWARDS , 
Plaintiff/appellant, 
\1.S. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and JACKO. TILLERY, 
Defendants/respondents, 
Case No. 19047 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a workmen's compensation case involving an 
employee of a restaurant in West Valley City, Utah, seeking worker's 
compensation benefits for pulmonary difficulties allegedly caused by 
smoke inhalation. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying applicant's claim for compensation 
benefits based upon a medical panel evaluation of no medical causal 
relationship between the smoke inhalation and the plaintiff's physical 
problems. A Motion for Review of the Order was then filed, which 
motion was denied by the Industrial Commission on February 9, 1983. 
T11e Industrial Commission affirmed the order of the Administrative 
Law Judge in pertinent part. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order, as affirm0J 
by the Industrial Commission, should be upheld hy the Sunreme Cnurt 
FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant Clarine Edwards (hereinaf t01 
plaintiff) filed an Application for Hearinq with the 
Commission of Utah on August 21, 1981, to determine a disabilit/ 
claim. (R. 1). The hearing was held on February 8, 1982. (P. 7) 
In her application and at the hearing, plaintiff asserted 
that an accident had occurred on March 25, 1981, in the kitchen of 
Krazy Klara's Restaurant where she worked as a manager and cook. Her 
claim was that the accident had caused or partly caused her total 
disability (R. 1) as result of serious lung disease. 
According to the testimony of plaintiff and one witness at 
the hearing, the accident involved a malfunction of the grill, whid 
created a lot of smoke. Plaintiff got down under the grill to try 
to fix it. Shortly thereafter, a deli very man came into the kitchen, 
found her coughing and choking from the smoke, and pulled her out of 
the room. (R. 9-11) Plaintiff further reported that, after the 
accident, she continued working for over two months, until June 5, 
1981, but that she had not been employed since that date. (R. 15) 
Following the hearing, the Adrninistrati ve Law ,Judge sent 
the matter to a medical panel for consideration of the medical 
issues. He appointed Dr. Frank Dituri and Dr. Theodore Noehren as 
members for this medical panel. (R. 44, 116). 
Copies of the report of the medical panel were distrihut0d 
to the parties on April 28, 1982. (R. 128) After an extensu·.ri "l 
time was granted, plaintiff's attorney filed timely ob:iections tc• t 
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report i,cith the Industrial Commission (R. 131-133). 
On August 16, 1982, plaintiff's attorney filed a Motion to 
vacate the Report of the Medical Panel and to have a new panel 
,Jf'f'ointed. (R. 141) In a memorandum in support of the motion, 
1 
,,,ntiff's attorney argued that Dr. Frank Dituri did not have the 
, xrert1se required by state law to be a member of the medical panel. 
(R. 142-143) 
On August 19, 1982, however, the motion was denied. In 
his order denying plaintiff's motion, the Administrative Law Judge 
specifically found both that Dr. Noehren was "eminently qualified 
to serve as a member of the Medical Panel" and that Dr. Dituri was 
"also well qualified to serve as chairman of the medical panel." 
(R. 144) 
A hearing on the objections to the medical panel report 
was held at the Industrial Commission on October 7, 1982. At the 
hearing, Dr. Dituri was examined as to his qualifications as a 
member of the medical panel. (R. 279-283, 305-306, 310) 
After the hearing, on October 29, 1982, plaintiff's 
attorney filed with the Industrial Commission a Brief in Support 
of Objections to the Report of the Medical Panel. (R. 216) This 
brief, essentially, made the same argument plaintiff's attorney had 
in the earlier memorandum which was denied--namely, that Dr. 
Dituri did not meet the statutorily required crualifications to be a 
member of the medical panel. (R. 217-218) 
The Industrial Commission also issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on October 29, 1982. (R. 240-243) The 
Law Judge's Finding of Fact was that "the applicant 
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suffers from severe common non-reversible chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease" but that there was "no 
causal connection between the app 1 i cant 's nresen t rond it ion ,11"1 
smoke inhalation of March 25, 1981." (R. 242) The conrlu';I'"' 
law was that "the applicant has failed to sustain her burcler1 nf 
proof .. And the Order, therefore, denied the applicant's rloin 
(R. 243) 
A Motion for Review of Order was then filed with the 
Industrial Commission by plaintiff's attorney on or about November l: 
1982. Plaintiff again sought to have the Industrial Corunission rev 10 
whether the medical panel in the case had been qualified. (R. 262 I 
This motion was denied by the Industrial Commission on February 9, 
1983. (R. 266-267) 
Plaintiff's present appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (on 
Writ of Review) is taken from the February 9, 1983, denial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE MEDICAL PANEL MEMBER IN QUESTION FULLY MET 
THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER UTAH LAW. 
There does not appear to be any Utah case law directly on 
point. Plaintiff cites the appropriate statutes, but misanalyzes 
their application and import. 
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) states that when 
an industrial claim is filed: 
. the Commission shall refer the medical aspects 
of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission and having the qualifications qenerally 
applicable to the medical panel set forth in §35-2-5h, 
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§35-2-56 (2), u.c.11. (1953 as amended), states in 
rPle:vant part: 
. the measurement of partial permanent disability 
is a highly technical and difficult task and should be 
placed in the hands of physicians specially trained 
for the care and treatment of the occupational 
disease involved, .. 
. . . the commission shall appoint an imoartial 
medical panel to consist of one or more physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or 
condition involved in the claim, ... 
Plaintiff's essential contention is that Dr. Dituri, 
chairman of the two-man medical panel in this case, did not meet 
the qualifications required by law. In particular, plaintiff suggests 
that Dr. Dituri should have been board certified specifically in 
pulmonary disease in order to be fully qualified. (plaintiff's brief 
page 5) 
(1) Although being "specially trained" is required under 
§35-2-58(2), supra, there is nothing in the Utah statutes to suggest 
that board certification in a subspecialty is se required. In 
fact, the relevant statutes do not give any special or unique meaning 
to the phrase "specially trained"; and no board certification of any 
kind is anywhere mentioned as a requirement. Therefore, the relevant 
statutes do not require that Dr. Dituri be board certified in the 
subspecialty of pulmonary medicine in order to be a qualified member 
of the medical panel. 
(2) Essentially, the Utah statutes, § 35-1-77 and § 35-2-56, 
supra, require that a physician appointed to a medical panel must be 
an expert in the relevant field of medicine. It is well established 
I aw in Utah that an expert can qualify as such by any combination of 
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training and practical experience. Maltby v. Cox Construction ro,., 1,. 
Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 1979). 
Furthermore, lack of certification by a national l,,-,,11 ,1 r 
not negate one's status as an expert. That would qo merely tn 1 1 
weight to be given to his expert opinion. Swan v. Lamb, 584 P 
818 (Utah 1978). 
(3) According to Dr. Dituri's testimony at the October 7, 
1982, hearing, he is board certified in internal medicine. 
Pulmonary medicine is a subspecialty of internal medicine, and all 
internists are considered qualified in pulmonary medicine. (R. 2Bl1 
From other testimony at the hearing, it would seem that 
Dr. Dituri is better qualified than most internists in this regard. 
He has been continuously on the faculty of some Medical school since 
1954 and is presently on the clinical faculty at the University of 
Utah Medical School. (R. 280-281) As a practicing internist, he 
diagnosed and treated pulmonary diseases of all types for over 20 
years. (R. 281) Furthermore, Dr. Dituri has specifically kept up 
in the area of pulmonary medicine because it is one of the big areas 
of disability-evaluation, his main activity in recent years. (R. 2RL 
309) 
None of this testimony was controverted in any way at the 
hearing. Indeed, Dr. Dituri's testimony as to his qualifications is 
neither denied by nor in conflict with anything in the entire record. 
It is certainly well within the ordinary Meaning of the 
phrase to say that Dr. Dituri is "specially trained" in pulmonary 
medicine, as required by the statute, § 35-2-56(2), supra. 
it must be concluded that Dr. Dituri was well qualified, within th, 
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meaning of the relevant Utah statutes, to be a member of the medical 
pane 1. 
POHJT II. 
SECTION 35-2-56 (2), U.C.A. (1953 AS AMENDED), 
MUST BE READ AS REQUIRING THAT PHYSICIANS APPOINTED 
TO A MEDICAL PANEL HAVE ADEQUATE SPECIALIZED 
TRAINING OR KNOWLEDGE. 
Plaintiff points out that the language in part of 
§ 35-2-56(2), supra, seems to indicate that physicians appointed to 
the medical panel should be physicians who specialize in the treatment 
of the disease in question. The relevant part of § 35-2-56(2) says: 
. the Commission shall appoint an impartial 
medical panel to consist of one or more physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or 
condition involved in the claim, 
(emphasis added) 
Thus, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Dituri did not qualify under the 
statute, because he is not currently undertaking the treatment of 
patients and is, instead, restricting his practice to consultation 
and disability evaluations. (Plaintiff's Brief, page 6) 
This is ambiguity here. In the first part of§ 35-2-56(2), 
supra, the statutory language is that the task of medical evaluation: 
. . should be placed in the hands of 
specially trained for the care and treatment of 
the occupational disease involved. (emphasis added) 
Here, the emphasis is on specialized training, rather than on 
specialized treatment or practice. 
Since the physician's role as a panel member is that of 
evaluation, not treatment, the statute's main concern must be to 
insure that panel members have adequate special training or knowledge. 
Ability to treat special cases or practice in a specialized area can 
be only of secondary concern--perhaps as evidence of the physician's 
specialized training or knowledge. 
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carrying plaintiff's analysis to its logical conclusion, 
the commission would have to eliminate any number of abundant 1 )' 
qualified physicians who evaluate cases, because they are consult 
or diagnosticians only and/or are retired physicians w'H' simnL 
evaluations as a service. Absent such fine people, the rliff1cu:1 
of finding physicians willing to serve would be greatly increased 
This would be a ridiculous result. A fair reading of the statute 
and the legislative intent could not be so. 
Taken as a whole, therefore, § 35-2-56(2), supra, is most 
reasonably interpreted as requiring that physicians appointed to a 
medical panel have adequate specialized training in the disease or 
condition involved. Without a doubt, Dr. Dituri and Dr. Neohren ha·.·c 
the requisite specialized training, both formally and by practical 
experience, in the treatment and analysis of the condition claimed 
by the applicant. 
POINT III 
THE MEDICAL PANEL AS A WHOLE FULLY MET THE 
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER UTAH LAW AS THE 
SECOND MEMBER WAS A BOARD CERTIFIED CARDIO-PULl10NARY 
SPECIALIST. 
Even if arquendo, board certification in the relevant 
subspecialty were required by Utah law, the medical panel appointee 
in the present case would still pass statutory muster. 
The co-member of the panel in this case was Dr. Theodore 
Noehren who is a board certified internist with a subspecialty 
certification in pulmonary internal medicine. (R. 144, 283-284) 
Plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Noehren's qualifications as a 
specialist in pulmonary medicine. § 35-2-56 (2), supra, states 1: 
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part: 
. the Commission shall appoint an impartial 
medical panel to consist of one or more physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or 
condition. (emphasis added) 
T/1e previous version of this section required the appointment of a 
medical panel consisting of "not less than three physicians . 
(1973, ch. 68,) According to the present version of the statute, 
then, the Administrative Law Judge could have simply appointed Dr. 
Noehren as a panel-of-one. Presumably, plaintiff could have had 
no objection to this. 
It is difficult, therefore, to see how plaintiff can be 
prejudiced by a panel of two that includes Dr. Noehren. Dr. Dituri 
and Dr. Noehren worked together closely in their evaluation of 
plaintiff's medical condition, and the medical panel's report was 
the product of the combined efforts of both physicians. (R. 283-285) 
The fact that Dr. Dituri was chairman of the panel does not 
necessarily mean he had to take dominant responsibility for performing 
the evaluation. In his letter of appointment, Dr. Dituri was 
instructed that he could bring in other specialists if he wanted to. 
(R. 116) Dr. Dituri's clinical and academic training as an 
internist certainly qualified him to understand and appreciate the 
matters being evaluated. Whether Dr. Dituri performed a separate 
evaluation, or looked to Dr. Noehren's evaluation is basically 
immaterial. As the Administrative Law Judge pointed out at the 
October 7, 1982, hearing, the essential issue is whether the 
panel, as a whole, is qualified. (R. 308) The Judge found 
th,H it was. 
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POINT IV. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION BY APPOINTING "'HE PHYSICIAN HJ nuESTin>1 
TO BE A MEMBER OF THE MEDICAL PANEL. 
Since the Industrial Conunission, rather than the M0r11 
panel, is the ultimate finder of fact, Redman Warehousing Coro._ 
Industrial Conunission of Utah, 454 P.2d 283, 285 (Utah 1969) , 1 
it is plausible to regard the Administrative Law Judqe 's relation '-c 
the medical panel as similar to that of a trial judge's relation to 
. 2 
expert witnesses. The trial judge is allowed considerable 
discretion in deciding whether a witness qualifies as an expert, 3 
Maltby v. Cox Construction Company, Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340, (Utah 
1979); Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2c1 481, 486 (Utah 1981). 
The Administrative Law Judge also exercises discretion in appointing 
the members of a medical panel. 
By analogy, such exercise of discretion by the Administrat. 
Law Judge should not be set aside unless, by a palpable ignorance of 
subject-matter manifested by the appointee, there is a clear abuse 
of discretion. State by and through Road Conunission v. Silliman, 
22 Utah 2d 33, 34-35, 448 P.2d 347. 348 (1968). 
1. In fact, in the Redman case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a 
Conunission award based on a back ailment, because it found that 
the Conunission had erroneously relied on a medical panel report 
that had little or no weight as evidence. 
2. The similarity between an Administrative Law Judge and a trial 
Judge is created in a number of provisions. See, generally: 
§§ 35-1-82.51 to 35-1-86, U.C.A., (1953 as amended). 
As with a trial court, a complete record is made at the 
Conunission hearing (§35-1-82.52). The hearing examiner issues 
subpoenas and contempt citations and causes depositions to be 
taken, as does a trial judge (§§ 35-1-82.52; 35-1-85.1). The 
administrative law judge findings of fact and conclusions of l 
and issues orders, as does a trial judge (§§ 35-1-82.52; 
35-1-85). Like the order of a regular trial court, an order '.· 
the Conunission is reviewable by the Supreme Court. (§§ 35-1-83' 
35-1-86). 
3. See: Rule 56, Utah Rules of Evidence; Federal Rules of 
Evidence 104, 702. 
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The Administrative Law Judges appoint hundreds of medical 
panels each year and are fully aware of the qualifications of the 
physicians involved. There was no abuse of discretion by the 
Administrative Law Judge in this case when he appointed Doctors 
Dituri and Neohren to form the medical panel. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether taken individually or together, the members of 
the medical panel in this case are fully qualified to act as a 
medical panel to evaluate the pulmonary maladies of the plaintiff. 
Utah law requires physicians to be specially trained in the disease 
or condition involved. The plaintiff would have this court find 
that a board certified internist who through his practice in earlier 
years of taking a special interest in pulmonary disorders and a 
second board certified internist with a subspecialty in pulmonary 
medicine do not have sufficient expertise to act as a medical panel. 
Simply because the plaintiff is not satisfied with their opinion as 
to the cause of her condition does not mean that the highly educated 
professionals on the panel are not qualified. The Industrial 
Conunission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should 
be sustained. 
DATED THIS of July, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE 
-11-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF was sent this JMJ._oay of ,July, iqs3, tn tht' 
following: 
Robert J. Debry 
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Administrative Law Judge 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-12-
